This addendum consists of 13 pages.
QUESTION 1: WHAT IMPACT DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE USSR IN 1989 HAVE ON SOUTH AFRICA?

SOURCE 1A

This is a cartoon by the English cartoonist M Cummings, dated 24 August 1988. It shows Gorbachev experiencing difficulty with 'glasnost'. The text at the bottom of the cartoon has been retyped for clarity.

'Cumings

"If she's like this as a baby, what will she be like when she's grown up?"

'DEMOCRACY FREEDOM!'
SOURCE 1B

The following extract highlights how the ANC prepared itself for negotiations.
Taken from *The Dream Deferred: Thabo Mbeki* by M Gevisser.

If one were following a paper trail to the beginnings of the ANC’s thinking about a negotiated settlement, one would start with a committee comprising of Thabo Mbeki, Pallo Jordan, Mac Maharaj, Sipho Makana and James Stuart that was appointed by OR Tambo. In an unsigned document, drafted in August 1984, the committee asked a provocative (challenging) series of questions: ‘Is the revolutionary transfer of power possible?’; ‘Is armed struggle a feasible option?’; ‘Is the military strategy of the ANC correct?’; ‘Could there be a negotiated settlement?’; and ‘what form would such negotiations take?’; ‘How would the ANC’s own followers respond?’ and ‘would the ANC require that there should be an intermediary (mediator) between itself and the Pretoria regime, or would it seek direct contact?’ ‘Would the ANC accept that Nelson Mandela and others enter into negotiations with Botha first, to prepare conditions for Oliver Tambo and others to enter into such negotiations?’ One of the most prescient (insightful) questions came towards the end of the document: ‘Should the ANC not redefine its relations with the USSR in order to ensure that it projects itself as an independent force and that it increases the possibility of its recognition by the Western countries …?’

SOURCE 1C

This source comments on how the collapse of communism paved the way for reforms in South Africa.
Taken from *The Bold Experiment: South Africa’s New Democracy* by H Giliomee et al.

Communist influence in the ANC was real enough, as was the ANC’s reliance on Eastern Bloc countries. The remarkable disappearance of Marxist-Leninist states, symbolised by the breaking down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, undercut ‘total onslaught’ thinking and gave De Klerk more political space in which to make bold reform moves. If the Kremlin no longer existed as the fountainhead (source) of a supposed world-wide conspiracy, the ANC could no longer be regarded simply as a client of the Soviets. Moreover, given the demise (downfall) of Communism as a significant threat, even the SACP (South African Communist Party) could be safely unbanned.

SOURCE 1D

This source focuses on De Klerk’s attempt to bring about reforms.
Taken from *Tomorrow is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution* by A Sparks.

‘… but in at least one respect De Klerk was critically different from Gorbachev. He stayed with changes. He did not try to freeze the process. He came to recognise that you cannot reform an oppressive system, that if you start to relax it you have to go the whole hog (do it thoroughly). There cannot be perestroika, only abolition (ending). He accepted that as it became evident. His own process of change kept pace with events, which is what has saved him – and South Africa. And so he remains on the scene, although in a lesser role.’
QUESTION 2: HOW DID THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION CONTRIBUTE TO EGYPT RE-IMAGINING ITSELF IN THE 1990s?

BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON EGYPT

In June 1953 Egypt became a republic under the leadership of Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. In 1970 Anwar Sadat succeeded Nasser. He brought about a shift in Egyptian-Soviet relations. Sadat turned to America for aid but was pressurised by the US President Jimmy Carter to recognise Israel. In response Egyptian hardliners assassinated Sadat because of his strong links with the West. Hosni Mubarak took up the leadership of Egypt in 1981 and re-established ties with the Soviet Union. However, by the 1990s, cultural, economic and political relations were consolidated with the Soviet Union because it embraced democracy.

SOURCE 2A

The source below comprises two perspectives on economic changes in Egypt after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.

**Perspective 1**: Focuses on how the collapse of communism affected Egypt. Taken from *Modern History* by Guy Arnold.

Aid had been the link between developed countries and Africa throughout the Cold War but this state of affairs came to an end with the demise of Russia. The amount of aid that Western countries were prepared to allocate to Africa had been reduced. Aid from Russia and the Soviet Union faded. Most countries now had to adhere to International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank lending principles … After the Cold War the only effective economic policy was the Western model, the Soviet one has been discredited and had collapsed … Economic policies had to be adjusted but brought about widespread suffering. This put pressure on governments to survive … Egypt could survive economically on American aid … in return Egypt had to be friendly with its Jewish neighbour (Israel).

**Perspective 2**: Focuses on the effects of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Egypt's economy. Taken from [http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/01/18/egypt-economists-blame-neo-liberalism-for-regions-woes/](http://globalgeopolitics.net/wordpress/2010/01/18/egypt-economists-blame-neo-liberalism-for-regions-woes/).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Egypt embarked on a 'neo-liberal' (new form of liberalism) economic policy changing its socialist-oriented policies towards those of the 'free market'. Now, however, many critics call the strategy a failure … The new economic policy aimed to 'liberalise' the economy by opening it up to imports from abroad and welcoming foreign investment in the country's development.

The fall of the Soviet Union allowed the rise of capitalist countries on the world stage … they favoured neo-liberal economics. At this point the International Monetary Fund and World Bank, which are controlled by the advanced, capitalist nations, America, Britain, France, began forcing developing nations to follow neo-liberal economic policies if those countries wanted to qualify for financial assistance.

These policies included privatisation of public assets, opening up to foreign investment, a smaller public service, no trade regulations, leaving prices to 'market forces' and encouraging the private sector to play an even larger role in the running of the state.
Hosni Mubarak became president of Egypt in 1981. His iron grip on every level of society kept Egypt stable, but at a price. It aggravated (worsened) economic inequalities, kept most of the 80 million people in poverty and led to bitterness. … But living standards in Egypt are low by international standards, and have declined consistently since 1990. According to United Nations figures, some 20 to 30 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line. Despite widespread poverty, however, uneven development has led to the emergence of a rich class that controls most of the country's wealth and enjoys a high standard of living that includes shopping at centres that feature the best imported goods. Living in cities, such as Cairo, the wealthy send their children to private schools and to universities abroad. Yet not far from these affluent (rich) neighbourhoods, a significant number of poor Egyptians live in squalor (poverty), with poor and overcrowded housing, limited food supply, and inadequate access to clean water.

As a result of high inflation, which at its peak, reached 28.5 per cent in 1989, the middle and lower classes have seen their living standards erode since the 1980s. The problem has been compounded (made worse) by the government's reduction of subsidies on basic foodstuffs and certain budget controls on public services since 1991. The government's awareness of the political implications of the complete lifting of subsidies has slowed down the implementation of IMF-mandated (instructed) price deregulation.
SOURCE 2C

This cartoon appeared in the *Pambazuka News*, a local Egyptian daily newspaper in December 2010. It was published in response to the mass uprisings against Hosni Mubarak's thirty-year rule of Egypt. Mubarak ruled Egypt during the period when it re-imagined itself. He was therefore responsible for the economic and political paralysis (mismanagement) of Egypt after 1990.

QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS PAVE THE WAY FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA?

SOURCE 3A

This source consists of a written and a visual source which relates to the Groote Schuur Minute.

**Written source:** This extract focuses on the meeting between senior leaders of the National Party government and the African National Congress (ANC) that was held on 2 May 1990, at Groote Schuur. Taken from *Turning Points in History – Book 6* edited by F du Toit.

The formal negotiations towards democracy in a unified South Africa had started. The first day's talks were exploratory and dealt with obstacles to negotiation. People on both sides were surprised that after so many decades of hostility they could talk to each other openly and straightforwardly, even share a few jokes. By the end of the third day they reached an agreement, called the Groote Schuur Minute. The ANC committed itself to a review of its armed struggle, and the government to reviewing security legislation and the end of the state of emergency. A working group was appointed to consider amnesty for political offences and the further release of political prisoners.

The main achievement of the Groote Schuur meeting, however, was that it generated a groundswell (wave) of hope and optimism in South Africa and in the international community that a solution would be possible.

Visual source on the next page.
Visual source: This photograph was taken on 2 May 1990, after the delegation of the National Party government and the ANC met at Groote Schuur in Cape Town. Taken from Turning Points in History – Book 6 edited by F du Toit.
SOURCE 3B

This source consists of a written and a visual source on the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA).

**Written source:** This is a description by Rich Mkhondo, a journalist, about the historic multi-party Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). It was held in 1991 at the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, Johannesburg. Taken from *Making History* by H Claire.

I was one of the first to arrive at the convention. In the first place I was anxious to catch a glimpse of all the men and women who would be shaping my future. Secondly, if I was going to record history in the making, I wanted to be there for the kick-off. In a setting replete (full of) with ironies, black and white security men escorted delegates amid the bright lights of photographers and television cameras. When Nelson Mandela and FW de Klerk arrived, they loomed (appeared) large, demonstrating that the hopes and fears, doubts and expectations of a democratic South Africa rested on their shoulders. For a little under twenty months, the two had conducted a political high-wire act that transformed South Africa, bringing hope to millions who had despaired. From this day the political future of Mandela and De Klerk would be two sides of the same coin. Charged with keeping the negotiation process going, they would try to unite the country’s fragmented groups, end township political killings, and bring lefties (communists) and right-wingers (conservatives) to the table. Between them they would determine whether there was a peaceful transition to a new South Africa or whether we would be plunged into ever-worsening violence.

**Visual source:** Shows the emblem of CODESA which represents both black and white South Africans during the multi-party talks in Kempton Park. Taken from *New History of South Africa* by H Giliomee, et al.

![CODESA Emblem](image-url)
SOURCE 3C

This is an extract from an article written by R Meyer, the chief negotiator for the National Party, entitled *Shift of Thinking*. Taken from the *Financial Mail Special Reports*, 7 May 2004.

The personal chemistry (good inter-personal relations) of some of the key role players, together with mutual trust and a sense of ownership of the process and its outcome, were all ingredients of the success story that is now a part of our history. Maybe the sense that we had but one chance to peacefully resolve the conflict became the driving force on both sides to produce a settlement. Even during the most difficult times of the negotiations – such as the breakdown of talks after the Boipatong massacre in June 1992 – it was this sense that kept us talking. And it ensured that we never returned to the starting point.

As time passed, all of us involved gained deeper and more focused insights into how to find answers to various conflicting positions. A shift took place in the minds of the NP government around the time of Boipatong. Until then we were still clinging to the old concept of maximum protection of white minority interests, secured through various constitutional mechanisms. It was an integral part of the overall problem. But reality dawned and with it a new realisation: equal rights for all, safeguarded through a set of fundamental rights enshrined in the constitution. This new focus resulted in a sense of liberation for each of us.
QUESTION 4: HOW DID THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC) DEAL WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S DIVIDED PAST?

SOURCE 4A
The following extract highlights the need for the TRC.

A key figure in the formulation of the law that established the commission was then Minister of Justice Dullah Omar. There was much public anxiety about the prospect of an anti-Afrikaner witch-hunt. He allayed (eased) these fears:

I wish to stress that the objective is not to conduct a witch-hunt or to haul violators of human rights before court to face charges. It is … to enable South Africans to come to terms with their past on a morally acceptable basis and to advance the cause of reconciliation.

Nor would the claims of abuses against the ANC be 'glossed over or swept under the carpet'.

Omar constantly emphasised the need to provide a forum for victims to speak the truth as they experienced it, and for perpetrators to reveal the truth as they knew it.

The TRC came into being early in 1996, under the joint leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and former cleric and liberal politician Alex Boraine. Other commissioners spanned the racial and political spectrum.

Its task was to examine human rights abuses on all sides between 1960 and 1994, hear testimony from victims and perpetrators and, where there was full disclosure and political motivation was clearly present, grant perpetrators amnesty from prosecution or civil action. The objective was to encourage truth-telling.

SOURCE 4B
This is part of an interview with the filmmaker, Frances Reid, who produced the film Long Night's Journey into Day. It deals with the work of the TRC, 1997.

[Interviewer]: When and how did you decide to undertake this project?

[Reid]: In 1997, after hearing stories of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, I was moved by what was happening there.

[Interviewer]: What were your goals in making Long Night's Journey into Day? What would you like a viewer to understand after seeing the film and what would you like to see happen with the film?

[Reid]: Our goals were to tell a story that was universal. We wanted to tell a story that people in the United States could relate to as well as people in South Africa or anywhere in the world. All of us have had the experience in some way of being wronged or of doing wrong to others. How do we cope with those experiences? We wanted to make a film that would spark viewers to think about and have conversations about how they face those issues in their own lives, in their families, in their communities, and in their nations.
**SOURCE 4C**

The following cartoon by Zapiro was published in the *Mail & Guardian* on 30 July 1998. It shows two participants in the middle, one black and one white, with the chairperson of the commission, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, standing on the stairs. Taken from *Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa: 10 Years On* by F du Toit.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following:

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